Alexander, Larry. Shadows in the Jungle: The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines in World War II. New York: New American Library, 2009.
Burgess, Library Journal (via www.bn.com), says that the author "has a story-telling style that makes this account, based largely on memoirs and interviews with the now elderly surviving Scouts, an easy read."
Hogan, David W., Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in
World War II. CMH Publication 70-42. Washington, DC: Department
of the Army, 1992.
Click for Table of Contents.
McRaven, William H. [ADM/USN] Special Operations -- Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
See Craig Whitlock, "Adm. William McRaven: The Terrorist Hunter on Whose Shoulders Osama bin Laden Raid Rested," Washington Post, 4 May 2011.
Renken, MI 23.2, says that this is "an excellent book for special operators and the intelligence personnel who support them." McRaven "examines eight classic special operations in fascinating detail": the rescue of Mussolini (1943); the prisoner of war rescue at Cabanatuan (1945); Son Tay (1970); the Israeli rescue at Entebbe (1976); and raids on Fort Eban Emael (1940), Alexandria (1941), Saint Nazaire (1942), and the Tirpitz (1943). This is "good history, plus an analytical approach worth thinking about."
For Johnson, Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997), the author's application of his framework for analysis makes Special Operations "a breath of fresh air and a genuine joy to read and study.... McRaven's theory of special operations states, 'special operations forces are able to achieve relative superiority over the enemy if they prepare a simple plan, which is carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose'.... Practitioners and students of special operations would do well to examine the utility of the author's analytical device as a possible planning tool. It appears to be more than adequate."
Nabbie, Eustace E. "The Alamo Scouts." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 87-92.
The Alamo Scouts "performed for the U.S. Sixth Army services similar to those rendered by OSS detachments in other overseas commands.... The Scouts' principal mission was ... reconnaissance behind enemy lines.... They were volunteers."
Rottman, Gordon L. US Special Warfare Units in the Pacific Theater 1941-45: Scouts, Raiders, Rangers and Reconnaissance Units. London: Osprey, 2005. [pb]
From back cover: "The bitter fighting in the Pacific Theater required new forms of warfare, and the gathering of detailed intelligence information on the remote and varied islands and their determined defenders. As a result, new scout, raider and reconnaissance units were formed -- the pioneers of today's special forces. Some units were small, while others comprised thousands of men. All contributed significantly to the war effort. This book examines a wide range of PTO special-warfare units, including the Alaskan and Alamo scouts, 5217th/1st Recon Battalion, Marine Amphibious Recon and Raider units, Amphibious Scouts, and 6th Ranger Battalion."
Zedric, Lance Q. Silent
Warriors of World War II: The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines. Ventura,
CA: Pathfinder Publishing, 1994.
Dilley, MI 21.2 (similar in CIRA Newsletter 20.3.), notes that the Alamo Scouts were activated in November 1943 as the Sixth Army Special Reconnaissance Unit. In this book, the author "breaks new ground.... Finally, the Alamo Scouts receive the recognition they deserve for their two years of service behind the lines.... Alamo Scout missions ... [ran] the special operations gamut, from intelligence/reconnaissance patrols to raids on POW camps and training and leading local guerrilla units."
According to Fischer, Special Warfare 11.3, the Alamo Scouts carried out 106 missions before they were disbanded in September 1945. "Most of the missions focused on intelligence-gathering, although some of the later missions ... were in the nature of liaison work with Philippine guerrillas." Zedric's work "contains some shortcomings that detract from its contribution to one's understanding the Pacific War." For instance, there is an "excessive dependence on secondary sources" and oral histories. And he "uncritically accepts the[] accuracy" of the diary accounts he uses. Also missing "is any mention of how the Japanese saw the Alamo Scouts." For these reasons, the book "should not ... be seen as the final word on the topic."
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